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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
According to the US Government, over 60 percent of the 
cocaine intended for the US market transit through Central 
American. Since the early 1990‘s, Colombian and Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) established logistics 
bases both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central 
America, facilitating the movements of large shipments of 
cocaine. In establishing these routes, the DTOs took 
advantage of a number of local enabling factors.  Among 
them, the preexistence of well-established smuggling 
networks, the weakness of law enforcement and judicial 
structures in most countries in the region, and the overall 
culture of lawless and impunity resulting from the civil 
conflicts that marked the paths to democracy of some of 
these nations. The tough campaigns launched against DTOs 
by the governments of Colombia and Mexico during the past 
eight years, coupled with the gradual evolution of both local 
and foreign criminal organizations (COs) involved in (but 
not exclusively) cocaine trafficking, seem to have further 
worsened the situation in Central America. 
 
 Old styled DTOs and local ―transportistas‖1 are 
increasingly challenged by new criminal groups, usually 
emerging from the military and claiming specific territories. 
These new groups are exerting a capillary control over all 
types of criminal activity taking place in the territories under 
their control.  The confrontation between two different 
criminal ―cultures‖-- the first, business oriented; the second 
one, territorial oriented-- constitutes a serious threat not only 
to the security of citizens, but also to the very consolidation 
of balanced democratic rule in the region.  
 
                                                             
1
 Transportistas are the truck, freight and all ground transportation 
personnel and routes that have traditionally moved goods and services 
throughout Central America and beyond. Transportistas have been also 
traditionally associated with contraband and more recently with 
smuggling of narcotics. 
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Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central 
American, if left unchecked. Responses by national 
institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will 
have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature 
of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating 
in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have 
to privilege investments in the areas of financial 
investigations, specialized prosecution and international 
cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In 
combating COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to 
privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment 
of local police corps that would then be capable of 
controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of 
external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to 
strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement 
agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat, 
its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law 
enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared 
toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial 
international cooperation (both investigative and judicial) 
that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the 
use of common investigative instruments and harmonized 
procedures.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
2011 will be remembered in Central America as the year of 
security. National and international agendas call for 
institutional responses to security issues (and criminal 
justice) at national and regional levels.  Citizens are 
particularly concerned with their own security and with 
transnational organized crime. National ballots and 
governments‘ programs in Costa Rica, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Panama have all included the issue 
of security among their top priorities. Similarly, the concept 
of regional strategic security has been re-shaped and re-
launched at regional Presidential Summits of the Central 
American Integration System (Sistema de Integración 
Centroamericana--SICA).The impact of crime on Central 
America‘s sustainable and balanced development constituted 
an integral part of the 2011 World Bank Development 
Report. Also, the 41th General Assembly of the Organization 
American States (OAS) held in San Salvador, El Salvador, 
was devoted to the issue of citizen security. In addition, the 
presidents of every country in the region almost weekly sign 
bilateral declarations with their main partners (including 
Mexico, Colombia, the US) supporting and launching 
ongoing and new security related initiatives.  
 
This awakening is certainly welcomed.  Along with the 
results of the many initiatives in force, it will certainly be of 
benefit to the whole region and to each country that follows 
political declarations with consequent reforms and budgetary 
allocations. Never as today has the region‘s policy decision-
makers understood the need for granting State policy status 
to security and justice concerns.  
 
The threat posed by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) 
and criminal organizations (COs) to Central American states 
and societies is, however, nothing more than the announced 
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evolution of preexisting (and to a certain extent unattended) 
phenomena: the growing importance of the region in the 
flow of drugs (mainly cocaine) toward the North American 
markets; and the evolution of local and foreign criminal 
operators who have made certain Central American 
territories their potential strongholds. In this respect, if the 
flow of money generated by drug (trafficking and 
production) continue to be a source of threat-- at least for the 
next ten years--then, the most serious challenge to Central 
American Governments and their international partners will 
come from emerging new criminal actors whose structure 
and modus operandi challenge directly the fundamental 
prerogatives of the State. Hence, the need for ―de-
narcotizing‖ the national and international agenda and 
expanding the response of States institutions to the 
development of a culture of security and justice build on 
citizenship, democratic values and the due respect for rule of 
law. 
 
CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE  
 
The 2007 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) Report, ―Crime and Development in Central 
America: Caught in the Crossfire,‖ listed geography, 
underdevelopment, low criminal justice capacity, and a 
history of conflict as the main vulnerability factors for the 
development and rooting of DTOs.
2
 Since the publishing of 
this first analysis, a few additional factors have further 
contributed to the escalation of the threat. For example, in 
Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe‘s anti-narcotic and anti-
guerrilla policies succeeded in regaining territories under 
State control and reducing both coca bush cultivation and 
room for illegality, including drug trafficking. Colombian 
                                                             
2
 United Nations, Office of Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in 
Central America:  Caught in the Crossfire, UN Publication ISBN 978-92-
1-030038-4, May 2007. 
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DTOs and guerrilla units involved in drug trafficking 
(including demobilized paramilitary groups) have 
subsequently shifted their trafficking bases and routes to 
neighboring countries. Large seizures and reports of 
operations against cocaine trafficking in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Panama, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica, are 
indicators of this development.  
 
Almost simultaneously, the violence resulting from the fight 
for control of land routes to the U.S. and the penetration of 
national and particularly, local and municipal institutions by 
the DTOs‘ power to corrupt left the Mexican Executive with 
no alternative but to also confront narcotrafficking squarely.  
It did so by mobilizing existing security resources (the Army 
and the Navy) and initiating radical reforms of security and 
justice institutions. As happened in Colombia, institutional 
progress in Mexico and successful tactical operations have 
accelerated the re-localization of Mexican DTOs (and their 
new and much more dangerous competitors, the Zeta) to 
neighboring countries, particularly Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador and Belize. 
 
The use of Central American countries as transshipment 
location for cocaine trafficking is not a new feature of the 
cocaine business. In the 1980s, Colombian cartels had 
already established logistics bases in Panama and Honduras. 
In the 1990s, the dismantling of major Colombian cartels and 
the rising importance of Mexican DTOs in shipping cocaine 
to the US via Mexican land routes,  turned Central American 
locations in meeting points between Colombian providers 
and Mexican buyers. The peace processes of the l980s and 
the restructuring of State security institutions that followed 
in El Salvador and Guatemala facilitated both the 
development of national drug trafficking operators and the 
consolidation of the foreign DTOs presence. 
6 
 
Cocaine shipments are transferred to Central American 
locations both by air and by sea.  In the 1980s, Juan Ramón 
Matta Ballesteros from Honduras had established the first air 
bridges between the Colombian, Central American 
transportistas and Mexican partners. In the late 1990s and 
following the Mexican DTOs rising power, air corridors 
from both Colombia and Central American locations 
extended up to southern Mexico. Today, the air corridors to 
the Caribbean and Central America, particularly in the 
Caribbean provinces of Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as 
those of Guatemala, and more recently Belize, continue to be 
of fundamental importance for DTOs. According to the Anti-
Narcotic Division of the National Civilian Police of El 
Salvador, 20 percent of all cocaine shipments transiting 
Central America are moved by air. From January to June 
2010, air traffic control authorities reported 79 suspicious 
events, of which 56were directed to and originating from 
Central American locations. In 2009, the number of reported 
suspicious air tracks totaled 192 events, of which 87 
involved Central American locations. In 2008, the events 
totaled 189; in 2007, there were 214.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3
 Presentation delivered by the Investigative Subdivision, Anti Narcotic 
Division, of the National Police of El Salvador, San Salvador, El 
Salvador, 09 November, 2010. 
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Suspicious air events 2009 
Source: Investigative subdivision, Anti Narcotic Division, National 
Civilian Police, El Salvador, 09, Nov, 2010. 
Again, according to the Anti-Narcotic Division of the 
National Civilian Police of El Salvador, maritime trafficking 
accounted for 80 percent of the cocaine flown via Central 
American countries in 2009. Shipments of several tons of 
cocaine are moved by ―fast speed‖ boats, fishing vessels, and 
freighters on both the Pacific and the Caribbean coasts. The 
use of self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels able 
to move shipments up to 7-10 tons has been recently 
reported on the Caribbean coast of Honduras, after its first 
appearance on the Pacific coasts a few years ago. In 2009, 
maritime authorities reported about 1141 suspicious 
maritime events of which, 552 were on the Pacific and 489 
in the Caribbean.
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4
 Ibid. 
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Suspicious Maritime Events 2009 
Source: Investigative subdivision, Anti Narcotic Division, National 
Civilian Police, El Salvador, 09 Nov. 2010. 
 
Data on maritime and air trafficking mirror data on cocaine 
seizures reported by law enforcement agencies in the region 
and confirm the growing importance of Central America in 
the cocaine trafficking business. 
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Seizure of Cocaine Shipments --Central America and 
Mexico 2006- 2010 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belize 82 32 16 28 2600
Costa Rica 22890 32435 16167 20887 14800
El Salvador 101 4075 1347 442 126
Guatemala 280 711 2214 6936 1400
Honduras 2714 0 6468 0 6134
Nicaragua 9720 13490 19500 9800 17500
Panama 36000 60000 51000 52400 49500
Mexico 21336 48168 19333 21631 9400
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Not available data have been reported as 0 (Belize 2009; Honduras 
2007 and 2009)  Source: UNODC World Drug Report (WDR) 2011; 
International Narcotics Control Report Strategy (INCRS) 2011 
According to the 2011 US State Department, International 
Narcotics Control Report Strategy (INCRS), over 60 percent 
of the cocaine trafficked to the US  today is smuggled 
through Central America.
5
 In 2010, all Central American 
countries, except El Salvador, reported cocaine seizures 
above 1 ton. Cumulative regional cocaine seizure from 2006 
to 2010 accounted for 461.5 tons, with an annual average of 
92.3 tons and a maximum peak of 110.7 tons in 2007. If the 
average interception rate of the region stands at 53–58 
                                                             
5
 International Narcotics Control Report Strategy 2011, Vol. 1 page 270, 
US Dept. of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs. 
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percent,
6
 then some 195 tons of cocaine may be shipped 
every year through Central America toward the US markets. 
Contrary to expectations, the quite sharp decline of cocaine 
seizure reported by Mexico in 2010 was not mirrored by any 
important increase in any of its neighboring countries (but 
Belize). This element coupled with a progressive but 
continued decline of cocaine consumption in the US may be 
interpreted as a tendency towards the stabilization of the 
regional cocaine flow. 
 
OPERATORS: FOREIGNERS AND INCREASINGLY 
LOCALS 
 
Drug trafficking is a quite complex and risky venture. As in 
licit trade, the added value of the item trafficked mirrors the 
complexity of its transport and the distance to travel from 
place of origin to destination. In the transnational criminal 
business it means that each frontier crossing adds complexity 
and value to the trafficked item. Hence, international drug 
trafficking provides for a chain of operators all along the 
trafficking route, each of them responsible for safely moving 
the illicit shipment from one point (frontier) to another. The 
longer the trip, the more rings added to the chain. Just as 
other traders do, drug trafficking entrepreneurs seek to 
reduce the risks involved. These risks can be identified as 
those related to law enforcement operations (seizure and 
judicial prosecution); losing of the merchandise/shipment 
accidentally or as a result of a betrayal (stealing by either a 
partner/associate/subcontractor or by a competing operators).  
 
                                                             
6
 Based on data of seizure and potential production, UNODC reckons the 
global cocaine interception rate between 46 and 60 percent of total 
production. The multi ton nature of the Central American shipments 
suggests the regional interception rate  could be tentatively estimated 
somewhere in between the low and top UNODC estimate. See, UNODC 
World Drug Report 2011; pg. 107. 
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In the early days of cocaine trafficking, Colombian DTOs 
known as ―cartels‖ co-owned trafficking routes. Risks were 
reduced through a combination of a quasi monopoly in the 
supply of the smuggled good and a common negotiating 
stance vis-á-vis the different rings of the trafficking chain.  
These two factors allowed the safe travel of joint shipments. 
Local partners involved in the transit of a shipment were 
rewarded on the basis of established tariffs and were 
responsible for ensuring both the logistics and the protection 
needed for the safe running of the operation. In the process, 
local service providers, both Mexican or Central American 
transportistas, profited from their knowledge and control of 
existing smuggling routes and the networks used to protect 
contraband, trafficking of arms and stolen goods.  The falling 
of the Colombian cartels and the rising of the Mexican DTOs 
changed this simple, but effective mechanism.  
 
Capitalizing on the old drug trafficking know-how gained 
from the trafficking of opiates and cannabis to the US, as 
well as on the accrued financial power resulting from the 
involvement in the cocaine business, Mexican DTOs 
upgraded their status into the cocaine trafficking business.  
First, they became associates; then partners and finally, they 
became independent operators.
7
 By the end of 1990s the 
presence of Mexican DTOs in Central American countries 
was probably already well established, even if no important 
                                                             
7
 The difference between ―associate‖ and ―partner‖ can be made on the 
basis of the share of the in- kind payment (drug) negotiated by DTOs 
with the owner of the shipment. The higher the share of in-kind payment, 
the  higher the exposure to the risk involved with the operation.  
―Independent operators‖ are DTOs which have guaranteed their supply 
directly from source and own the trafficking chain (route) which allows 
the transfer of shipment to wholesale distributors at final markets. In this 
respect it can be assumed that major Mexican DTOs like the Sinaloa and 
the Gulf cartels, operate as independent operators, buying raw material 
(cocaine HCL and more recently, cocaine base) directly from the 
Colombian DTOs suppliers or associates.   
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arrests and law enforcement operations can support this 
claim.
8
 This lack of evidence may be justified by the low, 
business oriented profile of Mexican DTOs and operators in 
transit countries and by the overall distribution of risk and 
responsibilities along the trafficking chains. Similarly, no 
major operations and arrests of either local or international 
drug trafficking entrepreneurs were undertaken by national 
Central American law enforcement and investigative 
institutions. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Mexican and Colombian DTOs 
operating in Central American relied on the logistic and 
protection services provided by local transportistas.   In a 
recent working paper, Steve S. Dudley provides a well-
constructed analysis of the role, development and respective 
geographical areas of operation of the transportistas in 
Guatemala and in Honduras.
9
 Dudley‘s analysis is further 
complemented by a recent investigative report on the so-
called ―Texis Cartel,‖ published by the electronic newspaper 
El Faro in El Salvador.
10
 Both reports highlight the nature of 
service provided by local transportistas, and their 
willingness to offer their services to whoever requests them.  
 
The role of local criminal networks in Costa Rica, Belize, 
Nicaragua and Panama is less clear. The geographical 
                                                             
8
 Joaquin Guzman Loera aka ―El Chapo Guzman‖, the leader of the 
Sinaloa DTOs was arrested somewhere nearby the border between 
Mexico and Guatemala in 1993  ―The Drug Lord Who Got Away,‖ Wall 
Street Journal, June 13, 2009. 
9
 Steven S. Dudley,  ―Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central  
America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras  Working Paper 
Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration,‖ Woodrow Wilson Center 
and the Trans-Border  Institute at the University of San Diego, May 
2010. 
10
 Sergio Arauz, Oscar Martínez, Efrén Lemus, ―El Cartel de los Texis,‖  
El Faro (El Salvador) 16 May 2011, 
http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/?st-full_text=4.   
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position of Panama and Costa Rica may justify the 
assumption of a more active participation of Colombian 
DTOs in the preparation and running of transshipment 
operations, and a residual participation and role of local 
operators as manpower for logistic tasks. The recent increase 
in homicide rates reported in these two countries, apparently 
linked to drug trafficking, may be a first signal of a changing 
scenario. In Nicaragua, the successful restructuring of 
civilian and military law enforcement structures reduced 
opportunities for the development of local trafficking 
networks, as corroborated by the maritime nature of the 
majority of Nicaraguan large cocaine seizures.  But, the 
situation in Nicaragua may also be evolving. Seizure of 
chemical precursors and the discovery of a large 
methamphetamine laboratory in Nicaraguan territory, along 
with the quite impressive record in seized air, sea and land 
vehicles,
11
 are all indicators of the increasing importance of 
the country for the cocaine trafficking route and of the likely 
development of the logistic networks enabling the passage of 
large and convoluted cocaine shipments. On the other hand, 
however, the impressive records in seizure and operations 
indicate the overall capacity of Nicaraguan law enforcement 
authorities in facing the phenomenon. 
 
The situation in Belize might be similar. The steady increase 
in cocaine and methamphetamine precursor seizures, the 
recent arrest of a US-wanted Guatemalan drug trafficker
12
 
and the increase in the local homicide rate (probably linked 
to increased drug trafficking) signal a worsening situation. 
Contrary to Nicaragua, however, Belizean authorities do not 
                                                             
11
 INCSR 2011, Vol.1 page 422.   
12
 In November 2010 a Belizean US DEA joint operation resulted in the 
seizure of 2.6 tons of cocaine, one aircraft and one go fast vessel in 
November 2010.  Also in 2010 Belizean authorities seized 40 tons of 
phenyl-acetic acid (PAA) a chemical precursor used in the manufacturing 
of methamphetamine, as well as 122,000 units of pseudoephedrine.  
INCSR 2011 , Vol.1 page 137.   
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seem to have the structural capacity to face the growing 
threat. With unpatrolled borders with both Mexico and 
Guatemala, a strategic position in the Caribbean Gulf, and its 
dual Caribbean and Central American cultures make Belize a 
natural target for transshipment of cocaine and chemical 
precursors, and a safe haven for hiding and laundering 
criminal derived proceeds. 
 
THE MEXICAN DTOS (AND COS) THREAT 
 
While Mexican DTOs have been present in Central 
American together with Colombian providers and trafficking 
operators, but they were not considered a major threat to 
regional stability. The recent changes in their modus 
operandi, their infiltration into local and central institutions, 
and the violence which is accompanying this dynamic have 
however changed the dimension of the threat they pose to 
Central American governments and societies. Invoking the 
principle of shared responsibilities in the fight against drug 
trafficking, Central American Heads of State have all boldly 
denounced the threat, and called upon the US, Colombia and 
Mexico to assume their responsibilities as major consumers, 
producers and transit countries. Indeed, as result of crack-
down against carried out in Colombia and Mexico, with the 
support of the US, Mexican and Colombian DTOs and COs 
have relocated their operations in the Central American 
region, producing the so-called ―cockroach effect.‖13 In 
                                                             
13
 Bruce Bagley, for example, argues that, the ―cockroach‖ effect refers 
specifically to the displacement of criminal networks from one 
city/state/region to another within a given country or from one country to 
another in search of safer havens and more pliable state 
authorities.‖Bruce Bagley, ―Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in 
the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty First Century, ―Agrarian 
Ideas for a Developing World, (March 24, 2011), Reprinted from article 
published in Spanish by Razón Pública in November 2010, 
http://agrarianideas.blogspot.com/2011/03/essay-on-drug-trends-by-
bruce-bagley.html.  
15 
 
essence, squeezed in their countries of origin,  DTOs, and 
COs are ―colonizing‖ new territories.  
 
The situation in some Central America countries is alarming 
indeed.  In Guatemala and in Honduras, head of states have 
denounced receiving dead threats by DTOs and COs.  Both 
countries, as well as El Salvador, have mobilized their 
Armies and sent them out to patrol and police part of the 
country in response to the growing crime situation and 
increased murder rates linked to drug trafficking.  There are 
reports of the presence of the Sinaloa cartel (DTOs) and of 
the Zetas (COs), and to a lesser extent, of the Gulf cartel 
(DTOs) and the Familia Michoacana (COs) in the region.
14
 
According to these reports, the Sinaloa Cartel led by Joaquin 
Guzman Loera aka ―El Chapo Guzman‖ would be well-
established on the Pacific side of Guatemala, Honduras and 
El Salvador, with agents operational also in Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica and Panama.  The Zetas, on the other hand, appear to be 
focusing their expansion on the Caribbean coast, with their 
main stronghold in Guatemala and an increased presence in 
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua.  
 
The pattern of geographical expansion of these two main 
Mexican criminal groups mirrors to a large extent their 
localization within the Mexican territory and their 
progressive cannibalization of other criminal groups 
operating in their territories. The expansion of the Sinaloa 
cartel confirms it‘s predominantly DTO nature and suggests 
it is trying to ensure its future by developing and controlling 
                                                                                                                            
 
14
 See, ―Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana y el cartel del Golfo teen 
presencia en Costa Rica, “La Jornada, 24 August 2011 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/08/24/politica/015n1pol; and 
―¿Cómo se reparten Centroamérica los cárteles mexicanos?” Animal 
Politico, April 7, 2011, 
http://www.animalpolitico.com/2011/04/%C2%BFcomo-se-reparten-
centroamerica-los-carteles-mexicanos/.  
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new cocaine (and increasingly methamphetamine) supply 
routes to North American and emerging markets. Its control 
of trafficking routes goes hand in hand with the development 
of production/refining facilities, increased opium poppy 
cultivation on the Pacific side of Guatemala‘s San Marco 
province, the discovery of a big cocaine refining laboratory 
in Honduras and the increased seizures of methamphetamine 
chemical precursors in Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Honduras.  Instead, the Zetas‘ concentration on the 
Caribbean coast reflects more the concurrence of some 
external factor rather than the result of a designed strategic 
plan. 
 
The Zetas are not specialized in drug trafficking, like the 
Sinaloa Cartel. Their objective is, indeed, to provide 
protection on activities run by criminal and licit economic 
operators in territories under their control. Also, the Zetas‘ 
localization is often the result of the relative easiness their 
scouts find in penetrating new territories and setting up a 
presence (cells). In this current bipolar scenario, the presence 
and operations of other Mexican criminal groups in Central 
America looks more like residual and complementary. The 
future of the these smaller Mexican criminal groups in the 
regions will probably depend on the outcomes of both, the 
fight the Sinaloa Cartel and the Zetas are staging in Mexico 
(and in some particular Central American locations like 
Guatemala, Honduras), as well as the result of the vigorous 
prosecution against them carried out in Mexico. 
 
In the short/mid-term, it could be expected that smaller 
Mexican DTOs and COs will side with bigger ones in drug 
trafficking as a business-focused tactical alliances. The 
natural law of evolution will then determine their fates. 
There are several possible scenarios.  In a first one, small 
DTOs will be swallowed by the bigger DTOs.  In this case, 
tactical alliances will favor the Sinaloa Cartel because of its 
17 
 
business orientation versus the military/territorial culture of 
the Zetas. A second possible scenario could envisage small 
DTOs inheriting the trafficking routes and the control of 
drug flow as a consequence of the mutual weakening of the 
cartel of Sinaloa and the Zetas, and the successful 
prosecution against them. This scenario would be similar to 
what happened to DTOs in Colombia immediately after the 
dismantling of the Bogotá, Medellin and Cali cartels. A third 
scenario sees the Sinaloa cartel and the Zetas reaching a 
peace settlement and agreeing on each other respective 
geographical area of domain (pax mafiosa).  The price of the 
peace would be paid by smaller DTOs and COs which would 
be either absorbed or eliminated. This scenario is, however, 
the least likely because of the radical difference in the nature 
of the two criminal organizations. Indeed, if the Sinaloa 
cartel has all the features of a traditional criminal 
organization, in the sense of aiming to ―control the 
production, supply and distribution of a given commodity or 
service unlawfully,‖ then the Zetas are much closer to a 
typical Mafia organization, whose aim is ―controlling the 
supply of protection‖15 in the territory where they are 
established. In other words a peace agreement among the 
two groups is highly unlike.  
 
NEW AND OLD CRIMINAL “CULTURES”  
 
There are fundamental difference in the nature and scope of 
the two major criminal operators in the Mexican and Central 
American scenario. These factors, as well as an 
understanding of their organizational structures, potential 
source of revenues, and recruitment mechanisms, provide 
important elements for both interpreting the steady increase 
in violence in the region, and also, for tailoring (read also re-
orienting) crime control policies and strategies.  
                                                             
15
 Federico Varese, Critical Concepts in Criminology (London, UK:  
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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The Sinaloa cartel derives all its revenues from drug 
production and trafficking.  In contrast, the Zetas do not 
seem to be specialized in any particular criminal venture but 
rather in using intimidation and violence for imposing their 
dominance. Hence, the Zetas‘ activities focus on making 
sure any criminal operator active in their area pay them a 
share of their profits (derecho de piso). Failure to abide by 
their rules is punished with violence. In this context, if the 
Sinaloa Cartel aims at controlling drug trafficking routes, the 
Zetas aims at controlling the territory where trafficking 
routes passes on.
16
 The shift in the nature of the core 
business of the Zetas, from an illicit trafficker in 
product/services (drugs, arms, people, etc.) to the provision 
of ―protection,‖ results in a reduced exposure to the 
economic risks linked to the specific criminal venture 
(seizures). It also allows the criminal group to expand their 
protection to any other commercial and productive activity 
taking place in the territory under their control, thus 
diversifying their potential sources of income. 
 
Differences in the core business also imply significant 
consequences in term of structures and recruitment 
modalities. This may prove to be of fundamental importance 
in the Central American context because of the co-existence 
of Mexican criminal operators with local COs. Pyramidal 
shaped structure is the standard for DTOs. Under this 
structure, risk reduction and profit maximization is in the 
hands of just a few.  
                                                             
16
 This different business orientation was also a feature of the Gulf Cartel 
of which the Zetas were originally the fire arm. According to an 
anonymous  source cited by Grupo Savant, the war which erupted in 
2005 between the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartel was caused by the decision of 
El Chapo Guzman  ― to fight to death‖ to recover the northeastern 
Mexican corridor where the Gulf Cartel was charging him a fee for 
moving drug shipments. In Grupo Savant,  ―The perfect storm is brewing 
in northeastern Mexico: A predictive analysis,‖  November 21, 2010; 
page 3. 
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Cartel de Sinaloa- Standard Hierarchy 
 
Source: Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal 
Groups in Sixteen Countries, UNODC September 2002, page 34. 
 
In DTOs typical structures, only those at the top of the 
pyramidal structure know who does what along the 
trafficking chain. Control of the trafficking route is the result 
of the ability at the top (drug kingpin, transportista) in 
managing the different ring of the chain. Recourse to 
violence is generally left for betrayal and stealing. The value 
of the item trafficked and the risk of seizure suggest that 
DTOs operators prefer a low profile and favor corruption as 
the instrument used for ensuring the smooth running of the 
business. Thus, the best trafficking route is the least 
noticeable. The segmented, secretive structure of DTOs also 
implies limited access to its internal organization. Manpower 
recruitment is handed at the level of each one of the rings of 
the trafficking chain, and is always dependent on the specific 
task that the ring will perform. Logistics tasks are mostly 
carried out by personnel that are not part of DTO‘s structure, 
but often are corrupted officials who ignore the true nature of 
the venture.  
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In contrast, not much is known about the structure of Zeta 
type COs. Their (para) military origin, the lack of 
specialization in any particular criminal business, a few 
media reports
17
 and anecdotes on their expansion in Mexico 
and the region, seem to suggest the following tentative 
analysis of their structure. Apparently the Zeta operates 
through a kind of ―feudal‖ system model.  It expands by 
progressively adding independent and self-sustained cells 
that are established for occupying new territories. EMPRA, a 
Mexico-based political risk advisory group, states that the 
Zetas structure,  
…is both rigidly hierarchical (original 
members were known as Z-1, Z-3, etc. 
according to their rank in the organization) 
while at the same time significantly 
decentralized. Regional bosses are relatively 
well-controlled, yet maintain a great deal of 
discretion as to how they will meet their 
annual financial goals.
18 
 
New cells are established by ‗true Zetas‘, meaning; 
operatives who are part of the core organization, and who are 
tasked with replicating the mother model in new territories. 
Scouting missions aimed at evaluating the situation on the 
ground and establishing contacts with possible new local 
affiliates often precede the opening up of new cells. The 
criteria used for the localization of new cells are unknown. 
Decisions are probably taken on a combination of factors, 
such as weakness of State institutions and of other local 
criminal organizations; strategic and economic importance of 
                                                             
17
 InSight published an excellent report on the Zetas in Guatemala; see, 
Steven Dudley,  ―The Zetas in Guatemala,‖  InSight Crime, 8 September 
2011. 
18
 EMPRA, ―The Rise of Los Zetas: A look into Mexico‘s most 
dangerous criminal organization; Ramifications for national security,‖ 20 
June 2011. 
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the territory; and preexisting knowledge and contacts with 
local criminal operators. In this respect the Zetas‘ structure 
may be classified as an evolution of the ―clustered hierarchy 
model‖ in which the previous military experience both in 
Mexico and Guatemala, offer a common identity among 
members.  
 
Los Zetas – Clustered Hierarchy (evolution of) 
 
Source: Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal 
Groups in Sixteen Countries, UNODC September 2002, page 37. 
 
Originally, Zetas‘ recruitment favored former military and 
law enforcement personnel
19
 because of their familiarity with 
weapons and violence, and their access to potential network 
within local criminal underworld and corruption network. 
These features probably continue to characterize the Zetas‘ 
senior level structure. Lower level recruitment depends more 
on criminal operators already present on the territory and to 
whom the mother cell offers a kind of franchise on the use of 
the Zeta‘s criminal mark. More recently recruitment has been 
                                                             
19
 It is well known that several Kaibiles, military staff from a special 
forces unit of the Guatemalan Army trained and equipped by the United 
States during that country‘s civil war, joined the ranks of the Zetas .   
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widely opened as indicated by the very young age and little 
criminal experience of Zetas arrested in Mexico.  This is also 
seen in the more recent tactical alliances of Zetas cells with 
juvenile gangs/maras and pandillas in both Mexico and 
Central America. There are also allegations of forced 
recruitment among kidnapped migrants transiting Mexico. 
 
This apparently contradictory recruitment strategy is justified 
in the need for new cells for ensuring territorial control 
through a bold physical presence. War and occupation 
scenarios call for large pool of fresh manpower (foot-
soldiers) that can be easily mobilized, or also easily disposed 
of. The mother cell provides the new franchisee with 
(military) training and probably arms as part of the affiliation 
package. Nothing is known about the obligations of new 
cells to the mother cell, as well as about the degree of 
operational freedom each new cell is endowed with. For 
sure, new cells are due to channel a share of their revenues to 
their respective mother cell. Similarly, it is most likely new 
cells must reach a kind of solidarity pact with their mother 
cell and the Zetas core group in case of violent confrontation 
with other criminal organizations. Finally, new cells are 
responsible for preserving the ―good name― of the Zetas by 
chastising with violence (death) the use of the Zetas‘ trade 
mark by unauthorized criminal operators. 
 
An analysis of the very different structure of these two 
criminal groups, their recruitment processes and needs,  
allow for a preliminary identification of their  likely 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as of the intrinsic risks and 
opportunities the two criminal models face in their expansion 
throughout the region. The closed and secretive structure of 
the Sinaloa Cartel and other DTOs, coupled with their 
specialization in drug (trafficking and production) and their 
business orientation can be considered one of its strengths 
because it offers the capacity for co-opting local partners and 
23 
 
generating mutual beneficial alliances. Recourse to violence 
is, in this perspective, only used as a last resort and as a 
punishment for violation of the rules of the game. 
 
The opposite can be said of the Zetas model. The autonomy 
of each cells, the very nature of its core business (territorial 
control) and the consequent need for sustaining control and 
expansion through unselective recruitment lead necessarily 
to the atomization of the original structure and the 
progressive separation, and confrontation, among cells. The 
Zetas‘ model of expansion also clashes with local criminal 
groups that will not accept their dominance. Hence, intra cell 
violence, as well as violence between cells and local 
criminal-groups becomes the rule until one of the fighting 
groups prevails. In this scenario, violence will also target 
innocent civilians residing in the territory under dispute. An 
exception to this dynamic may be represented by 
(temporary) alliances with seasoned Maras‘ groups and local 
pandillas, that to certain extent, operate similarly to the Zetas 
(territorial control, diversification of criminal activities with 
no particular specialization and extensive use of intimidation 
and violence). Also in this case, however, alliances are 
destined to be broken and violent confrontation may become 
the final likely scenario. On the basis of the above, it can be 
said that the Zetas‘ model of expansion is its strength in the 
short run, but also a weakness in the mid and long terms. 
 
LATEST TRENDS AND NEW THREATS 
 
Recent changes in major drug consumption markets, 
particularly the US, may lead Mexican DTOs to restructure 
not only their trafficking routes, but also their overall 
product portfolio. During the last five years, Central 
American countries have reported steady increases in the 
seizures of chemical precursors and laboratories used mostly 
24 
 
in the manufacture of methamphetamines.
20
 Despite the fact 
that methamphetamine production is quite a simple process, 
the volume of chemical precursors seized, together with 
location of seizures and route of smuggling seems to point at 
Mexican DTOs as the most likely owners of these new 
business ventures. Both the Sinaloa Cartel and La Familia 
Michoacana ―own‖ the know-how of methamphetamine 
production and have a well-developed international 
distribution network, both in North America and new 
emerging markets.  Re-localization of methamphetamine 
production seems also to be accompanied by an attempt in 
increasing control and revenues on cocaine processing, as 
well as on production and exporting of local heroin. In 
March 2011, Honduran law enforcement authorities 
discovered and dismantled a cocaine processing lab with 
capacity for processing up to 400 kilos of cocaine paste into 
cocaine HCL per week. According to Honduran authorities 
the discovered lab was operated by the Sinaloa Cartel.
21
 In 
Guatemala, national authorities eradicated 918 ha of opium 
poppy in 2010 and 1345 ha in 2009.
22
 Tentative estimates 
from well informed non-official sources supported by 
eradication data range local opium poppy cultivation 
between 1500 and 2000 ha.  
                                                             
20
 UNODC, Amphetamines and Ecstasy 2011 Global ATS Assessment, 
September 2011. 
21
 ―Laboratorio hallado en Honduras sería del cartel de Sinaloa, según 
ministro,‖ Latino Foxnews, 11 March 2011, 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/03/11/laboratorio-hallado-
en-honduras-sera-del-cartel-sinaloa-segn-ministro/#ixzz1XYuayWWl. 
On the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel in Honduras see also, James 
Bosworth, ―Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis,‖ 
Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, Latin 
American Program Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
December 2010, pages 5 to 7, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf.  
22
 UNODC WDR 2011, Op cit, page 59. 
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Opium poppy fields, San Marcos Province, Guatemala, June 2011 
 
According to local sources the harvested opium gum is sold 
to Mexican buyers either in situ or at the nearby Mexico-
26 
 
Guatemala frontier. Its long tradition in heroin production 
and trafficking to the US, coupled with its established 
presence in Guatemala, suggest a likely participation of the 
Sinaloa Cartel in this area. 
 
The Sinaloa Cartel expansion of the products profile goes 
hand in hand with its apparent market expansion. In 2010, 
and following a number of seizure, Australian authorities 
warned about the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel in the 
Australian cocaine market.
23
 In 2008, Malaysian authorities 
dismantled a methamphetamine lab and arrested a group of 
Mexican apparently also linked to the Sinaloa Cartel.
24
 The 
Pacific relocation seems also to be confirmed by reports 
about the presence of Sinaloa Cartel operational cells in 
Ecuador and Peru.
25
 These reports, along with the 
consolidated presence of the Sinaloa cartel in marijuana 
production and trafficking, indicate that the Sinaloa Cartel is 
attempting to establish itself as the first illicit narcotics 
multinational, controlling production and wholesale 
distribution of a variety of drugs to different markets. In this 
context, the power of the Sinaloa Cartel will be inherent to 
its capacity of generating revenues through a continuous re-
profiling of both its products and its presence on global 
markets, and of reinvesting revenues in the network of 
                                                             
23
 ―El cártel de Sinaloa pone en jaque a las autoridades de Australia,‖ 
CNN Mexico, 15 September 2010, 
http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/09/15/el-cartel-de-sinaloa-pone-en-
jaque-a-las-autoridades-de-australia. See also, Tim Palmer, ―Mexican 
Connection‖ Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 15 September 2010, 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s3012966.html.  
24
 Alexandra Olson, ―Mexicans busted for making meth — in Malaysia,‖ 
Associated Press , 24 April, 2011 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42739155/. 
25
 Elyssa Pachico,  ―Sinaloa Cartel Expands Reach in Peru, Australia,‖ 
InSight Crime, 03 January 2011, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-
news/item/396-sinaloa-cartel-expands-reach-in-peru-australia.  
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corruption which allows the smooth running of production 
and trafficking operations. 
 
Another new and quite concerning phenomenon apparently 
linked to the growing power of COs (both local and 
Mexican) in Central America is land purchases. According to 
a recent study on land ownership transfer in the Petén 
Department, Guatemala, drug trafficking transportistas are 
the ones behind a kind of agrarian reform.
26
 From 2005 to 
2010, 90 percent of land changed hands in the municipality 
of Sayaxché.  The figures in San José were 75 percent and 69 
percent in La Libertad. Other nine municipalities in the Petén 
recorded relevant changes in land ownership, ranging from 
12 to 35 percent of registered land.  
 
Money laundering and securing logistics bases and land-
strips for small planes seems to be the main reason for 
purchasing land in the Petén Department.  Some lands are 
illegally sold since the sellers have occupied the land and 
have no legal titles. New buyers trust the State will 
legitimize their de facto ownership sooner or later. The 
original illegality of land tenure makes sellers particularly 
vulnerable to threat and violence by drug traffickers 
interested in their lands. According to recent research, the 
Zetas do not seem to be directly involved in land purchasing. 
Nevertheless, the massacre of 27 workers employed in a 
cattle ranch owned by an alleged local drug trafficker in the 
La Libertad municipality
27
 is a clear indicator of the presence 
and dominium of the Zetas in these municipalities.
28
 Less 
                                                             
26 Miguel L. Castillo,  Land ownership transfer in the Petén, Guatemala, 
WHEMSAC/Applied Research Center, Florida International University, 
Miami, FL. February 2011. 
27
 ―Zetas asesinan a 27 jornaleros en Petén,‖ PrensaLibera com , 16 May 
2011, http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Zetas-asesinan-jornaleros-
Peten_0_481751878.html. 
28 See, S. Dudley, ―Zetas in Guatemala,‖  op. cit. 
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documented but equally dramatic is the alleged involvement 
of drug trafficking organizations in Bajo Aguan, an eastern 
region of the Colon Department of Honduras, where 14 
people were killed in August 2011. According to sources, the 
killing was linked to a land dispute among indigenous 
communities, cattle and agricultural investors, and drug 
traffickers.
29
 In this regard, the issue of land tenure and the 
consequences of the de facto ―agrarian reform‖ pushed ahead 
by drug traffickers and paramilitaries in Colombia
30
 ought to 
ring an alarm bell to Central American governments.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central 
American, if left unchecked. Responses by national 
institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will 
have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature 
of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating 
in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have 
to privilege investments in the areas of financial 
investigations, specialized prosecution and international 
cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In 
combating COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to 
privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment 
of local police corps that would then be capable of 
controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of 
external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to 
                                                             
29 ―Narcotraficantes en camino de ser latifundistas en Colón, “La 
Tribuna 19 June 2011, 
http://www.latribuna.hn/2011/06/19/narcotraficantes-en-camino-de-ser-
latifundistas-en-colon/.  See also,  Hannah Stone, ―Are Foreign Criminal 
Gangs Driving Honduras Land Conflict?‖ Insight Crime, 22 August 2011 
, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1446-are-foreign-
criminal-gangs-driving-honduras-land-conflict. 
30 Land Reform a Threat to Criminal Interests in Colombia,‖ InSight 
Crime, 12 January 2011, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-
news/item/424-land-reform-a-threat-to-criminal-interests-in-colombia. 
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strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement 
agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat, 
its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law 
enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared 
toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial 
international cooperation (both investigative and judicial) 
that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the 
use of common investigative instruments and harmonized 
procedures. 
 
It is unlikely that the current level of violence experienced 
by some Central American countries will dramatically drop 
in the short run.  External criminal operators are certainly an 
important cause, but not the only one. In fact, a significantly 
sharp reduction of violence in areas that today are 
characterized by high concentration of DTOs‘ and COs‘ 
interests and investments, ought to raise the suspicion 
whether the achieved peace is not the result of a complete 
take-over of the territory by one dominant criminal 
organization. As correctly stated by Prof. Bagley, 
 
States determine the form or type of 
organized crime that can operate and flourish 
within a given national territory.
31
 
 
 Hence, the growth or fall of Mexican DTOs and COs in 
Central America will depend on the commitments of Central 
American Government to facing and defeating them. At this 
time, all signs point at a sincere will on the part of Central 
American decision-makers and their international partners, to 
moving ahead in accomplishing this indispensable endeavor.    
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